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Since Biblical times, men have feared being falsely accused of rape.1
Indeed, the notion that women will lie about rape or sexual assault for any
number of reasons is firmly entrenched in societal attitudes toward women and
rape.' Whether the motive to lie finds voice in a woman scorned,3 in the
sexually repressed and fantasizing woman who desires to be raped,4 or in the
unchaste woman who seeks to mask her own promiscuity by crying rape, these
myths have allowed the focus in rape cases to be placed on the victim's lack
of innocence rather than on the guilt of the accused.5
The notion of a woman's supposed propensity to lie6 about sexual
encounters invaded our jurisprudence long ago and provides the rationale for
admitting prior false allegations of rape made by the complaining witness in
rape cases.7 Despite the enactment of rape shield statutes, 8 which were
t "False in one thing, false in everything." LATIN WORDS AND PHRASES FOR LAWYERS 90 (R.S.
Vasan ed. 1980).
ft Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Vermont. This article is adapted from a thesis submitted by
the author in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws in the Judicial Process
at the University of Virginia. I am very grateful to the law clerks and interns who worked with me on this
project. For concept development, I value my association with Vicki Henry; for tireless research, I thank
Jennifer Wagner; for editing suggestions, footnotes and final format, I greatly appreciate the assistance
of Johan Maitland and Carrie Legus; and for assistance in translating thesis to article, I thank Bridget Asay.
I owe a special debt of gratitude to my husband, Thomas N. Wies, who advised and supported me
throughout the project, and who willingly read more drafts of this article than he cares to remember.
1. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 12-13, 25 (1975).
Brownmiller details the story of Potiphar, an Egyptian whose wife sought the sexual favors of a slave,
Joseph the Israelite. Joseph fled her advances, Potiphar's wife cried rape and Joseph was thrown into
prison. Id. at 22.
2. Id. at 251, 415; SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 45 (1987); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be
Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013,
1039 (1991); James A. Vaught & Margaret Henning, Admissibility of a Rape Victim s Prior Sexual Conduct
in Texas: A Contemporary Review and Analysis, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 893, 901 (1992).
3. "Nor Hell a fury, like a Woman scorn'd." WILLIAM CONGREVE, THE MOURNING BRIDE act Il1,
sc. 1, line 458 (1697).
4. BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 315-17, 322-33.
5. Torrey, supra note 2, at 1058; see id. at 1025-31, for a discussion of prevalent rape myths in
addition to false reporting, such as that only women with bad reputations are raped; that women want to
be raped and fantasize about it; and that women invite rape by their behavior and appearance.
6. One need look no further for proof of the currency of rape mythology than the 1991 Senate
confirmation hearings on then Supreme Court nominee, Clarence Thomas. Anita Hill, Thomas's former
employee at the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, accused Thomas of sexual
harassment. The "Lying Woman/Innocent Man" stereotype was prevalent throughout the hearings as Hill
was vilified as either a woman scorned or one whose mental imbalance had caused her to fantasize the
verbal sexual encounters that she described. Ann Althouse, Beyond King Solomon's Harlots: Women in
Evidence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1265, 1277 n.33 (1992).
7. Perhaps the most frequently reported quotation is that of Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale, a
seventeenth-century jurist, who wrote that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved,
and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent." MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (photo. reprint 1987) (1736). As antiquated as it may seem the warning
remained in California's standard jury instructions for rape as late as 1973, with the accompanying direction
that the complaining party's allegation was, therefore, to be viewed with caution. BROWNMILLER, supra
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intended to limit judicial discretion to find that a complaining party's sexual
past was relevant to her veracity,9 old problems have survived the new rules.
Common law exceptions to evidentiary rules and statutory exceptions to rape
shield statutes have preserved the "woman as liar" stereotype by their
assumption that prior false allegations of rape are highly probative in a
subsequent case."0 Many courts have permitted prior false allegations to be
proved by extrinsic evidence of specific acts, despite rules on character
evidence that prohibit the use of such evidence for the purpose of attacking
a witness's credibility. I' Frequently, the supposed justification is the
Confrontation Clause, 2 which is advanced without any of the analysis that
should be undertaken in the consideration of character evidence. 13
This paper challenges the assumption that a complaining witness's prior
false allegation of rape, offered solely to prove that she has a propensity to lie
note 2, at 414. As recently as the 1970 revised edition of Wigmore on Evidence, the treatise states,
"[o]ccasionally is found in woman [sexual assault] complainants . . . a dangerous form of abnormal
mentality . . . to fabricate irresponsibly charges of sex offenses against persons totally innocent." IliA
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 934a (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) [hereinafter WIGMORE (Chadboum)].
8. Forty-nine states and the United States Congress have enacted rape shield laws that generally bar
admission of evidence of a rape complainant's sexual conduct. FED. R. EVID. 412; ALA. CODE § 12-21-203
(Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-1810.1-.4 (1977 & Supp.
1985); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (West 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508-3509 (1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. ch. 794.022(2)-(3) (Harrison 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1995); HAW. R. EViD. 412;
IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725,
§§ 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IOWA R. EVID. 412; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (Supp. 1984); KY.
R. EVID. 412; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1992); ME. R. EVID. 412; MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 461A (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21B (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.520j (1993); MINN. R. EVID. 412; MiSs. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-68 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
491.015 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321 (1994); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-
32.1-.3 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. R. EviD. 413; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.42 (1995); N.C. R. EVID. 412;
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-20-14 to -15 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page 1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2142 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210 (1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3104 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op.
& Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1990);
TEX. R. CRIN. Ev. ch. 685 § 96; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7
(1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11 (1992); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 972.11(2) (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-312 (1988).
The 1994 Crime Bill modified the Federal Rule of Evidence 412 and took effect December 1, 1994.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40141, 108 Stat. 1796,
1918 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2074). The major changes include: (1) extending coverage to civil
cases; and (2) changing the 403 balancing test governing admissibility to incorporate consideration of the
victim and to shift to the proponent the burden of demonstrating the probative value of the proposed
evidence.
9. Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the
Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 766-70 (1986).
10. Id. at 858; Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21 (1977); J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws
and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 544-45 (1980).
11. FED. R. EViD. 608(b). See 28 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6111, at 27-30 (1993).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. I discuss the constitutional requirements with respect to character
evidence in Part I.E, infra.
13. See cases cited infra note 113.
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about rape, 4 is of such high probative value that it should be admitted to
impeach the witness and proved by extrinsic evidence if she denies it. It is an
evidentiary question that deserves the same analysis that courts give to
character evidence in less gender-charged contexts. At the very least, it
requires a contextualized analysis of probative value.
Parts I.A. and I.B. give an introduction to the problem that illustrates the
manner in which prior false allegations of rape are treated differently from
prior false statements made by witnesses testifying in other crimes. Part I.C.
explains the character evidence rules as they are applied in most cases. Part
I.D. traces the origin and development of the special rule that has been applied
in rape cases, and argues that it is grounded in rape mythology. Part I.E.
discusses the analytical mistakes that have led courts to mischaracterize prior
false allegations of rape, offered for a character purpose, as evidence that is
constitutionally compelled.
Part II contends that rules limiting the admission of character evidence
should not be ignored in sexual assault cases, and that prior false accusations
of rape offered solely for character purposes should be analyzed under Rules
403 and 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (or their counterparts in state
jurisdictions). The emphasis should be on probative value, which must be
considered in a contextual analysis of the evidence. Part III concludes that a
change in the evidentiary rules governing prior false accusations of rape,
though not a perfect solution, will reduce gender bias in rape cases.
I.
A. Introduction to the Problem
The treatment of prior false accusations of rape stands in sharp contrast
to the treatment of prior false statements made by witnesses testifying for the
prosecution in other kinds of crimes. The difference is shown by postulating
a court's evidentiary rulings in the following hypotheticals.
Suppose that a complaining witness is testifying to the identity of the person
who mugged him and stole his wallet. The victim was beaten quite brutally,
and his wallet was later found in a dumpster in another part of the city. At
trial, then, the issue is not whether the crime occurred (the "corpus delicti")
but whether the defendant committed the crime. The victim is the only witness
who can testify to the defendant's identity. The defendant attempts to introduce
evidence of a prior incident in which the victim made a charge of robbery and
then recanted. In the earlier situation, the victim loaned his car to a friend,
who drove carelessly and wrecked the car. In a fit of misguided anger, the
14. This paper is not about the admission of prior false allegations of rape or sexual conduct offered
to show motive to fabricate, bias, or a repetitive pattern of false charges, all of which are always admissible
to impeach the reliability of the complaining witness'ss testimony. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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victim had called the police and claimed that his friend had stolen his car. Soon
after, he recanted the bogus car theft story.
The robbery hypothetical is analogous to a rape case in which the rape was
so brutal that the defendant cannot, as a defense, allege that the victim
consented. Again, the only issue at trial is the identity of the defendant, and
the victim is the only witness who can testify to that issue. The defendant
attempts to introduce evidence that on a prior occasion, the victim had charged
her boyfriend with rape after a bitter argument, but had later recanted the
story, stating that the intercourse was in fact consensual.
In these two examples, the evidentiary question for the judge is exactly the
same: whether the prior lie of the victim has any bearing on the credibility of
the victim in the case before the court, such that the defendant may use the
lie to impeach, or discredit, the victim's testimony. Despite the similarity of
the evidentiary questions, the rules are applied quite differently.
A trial court judge would almost certainly treat the evidence of the prior
false allegation of robbery as character evidence, or evidence that tends to
show that the witness has a propensity to lie. The judge would then weigh the
probative value of the evidence (the usefulness of the evidence in determining
the credibility of the witnesses and, by extension, the innocence or guilt of the
defendant) against the likelihood that the evidence would mislead or confuse
the jury, or be unfairly prejudicial. In the first example, the evidence of the
prior false allegation is quite likely to be excluded. Although both the false
allegation and the current accusation involved robbery, the factual
circumstances are so different that the evidence of the prior lie says very little
about whether the complaining witness is lying in this case. While the
probative value is low, there is a substantial danger that the jury would be
misled by the evidence, most likely because they will give it undue weight.
Even if the evidence were admitted, the defendant would be permitted only
to ask the witness about the prior false allegation on cross-examination, and
would not be permitted to bring in other evidence regarding the prior claim.
In the rape case hypothetical, the prior false allegation is likely to be
admitted on the grounds that a prior false allegation of rape is so highly
probative of the victim's credibility that the defendant should be allowed to
cross-examine her on the prior statement. Moreover, the court is likely to
permit the presentation of extrinsic evidence (other witnesses and documents)
to prove the defendant's point that the victim lied about rape on another
occasion, and is therefore lying on this occasion.
The comparison of these hypotheticals reveals the crux of the problem
addressed by this Article. A specific type of evidence, a prior false allegation
of the crime charged, is treated differently in rape cases than in other types
of criminal cases, although the evidentiary issues are the same. The heightened
focus on prior false allegations in rape cases can be explained only by an
impermissible reliance on rape mythology.
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B. The Legal Framework
A brief discussion of where the treatment of prior false allegations of rape
fits within the broader evidentiary context defines the legal issue under
discussion and illustrates the extraordinary scrutiny given to the rape victim's
credibility. In many jurisdictions, courts and legislatures have created special
evidentiary rules for the impeachment of complainants in sexual assault
prosecutions who allegedly have made prior false allegations of rape."5
Admissibility of evidence under the special rule is predicated on the
defendant's ability to show that the prior allegation was, in fact, false' 6-it
is axiomatic that if a prior allegation is true, it provides no basis to impeach
the victim's credibility as to the events of her current complaint. "7 If the court
satisfies itself that the allegation was false, 8 it is generally admitted without
15. In three states, the rule exists as part of the state's rape shield statute, and expressly makes prior
false allegations of sexual assault admissible in subsequent rape cases as an exception to the usual rape
shield prohibition on the admission of prior sexual conduct. MINN. R. EVID. 412; VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 3255(a)(3)(c) (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 971.31(11), 972.11(2) (West 1985). Injurisdictions
without a statutory provision, courts have adopted similar rules by judicial decision, reasoning that prior
false allegations of sexual assault are not prior sexual conduct and that their admission is not, therefore,
barred by rape shield statutes. Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); Smith v.
State, 377 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga. 1989); Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Cox
v. State, 443 A.2d 607, 613 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987,
991 (Mass. 1978); Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (Nev. 1989); State v. Durham, 327 S.E.2d 920, 926
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Baron, 292 S.E.2d 741, 743 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Boggs, 588
N.E.2d 813, 816 (Ohio 1992); State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 613 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Clinebell v.
Virginia, 368 S.E.2d 263, 264-65 (Va. 1988).
16. Although courts may accept various degrees of deviation from the evidentiary rules, they do agree
that there is no relevance to a prior allegation of rape unless it is shown to be false. See, e.g., Hughes v.
Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1981); Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989);
Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Hutchinson, 688 P.2d 209, 213
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Slater, 579 A.2d 591, 593 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990); Smith v. State, 377
S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga. 1989); Idaho v. Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d 830, 833 (Idaho 1984); People v.
Alexander, 452 N.E.2d 591, 595 (I11. App. Ct. 1983); Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Mass. 1978); State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d
193, 198-201 (Mont. 1984); Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 90 (Nev. 1989); State v. Johnson, 692 P.2d
35, 43 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Mandel, 401 N.E.2d 185, 187 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Kringstad,
353 N.W.2d 302, 311 (N.D. 1984); State v. Nab, 421 P.2d 388, 391 (Or. 1966); Clinebell v. Virginia,
368 S.E.2d 263, 266 (Va. 1988); State v. Demos, 619 P.2d 968, 969 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); State v.
DeSantis, 456 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Wis. 1990). See also MINN. R. EVID. 412; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
3255(a)(3)(c) (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 971.31(11), 972.11(2) (West 1985).
17. See, e.g., State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d 302, 311 (N.D. 1984) ("Evidence of one truthful charge
of rape does not make the truthfulness of a subsequent rape charge 'less probable than it would be without
the evidence.' Thus, to be relevant in this case, the prior charge must necessarily have been false."
(citation omitted)).
18. Earlier cases give very short shrift to whether the prior allegation of sexual assault was, in fact,
false. See, e.g., People v. Hurlburt, 333 P.2d 82, 86-87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (evidence that
prosecutrix has made prior false accusations is relevant as to the state of mind of the prosecutrix and has
great probative value, both as substantive evidence that the alleged rape did not occur, and as impeachment
of her general character and reputation); State v. Quinn, 80 Conn. 546, 548 (1908) (trial judge has
discretion to permit prosecutrix to be asked about whether she had not falsely charged others with rape,
and after denial, to permit testimony in contradiction); People v. Evans, 40 N.W. 473, 478 (Mich. 1888)
(error not to permit, after denial by prosecutrix, independent testimony that prosecutrix had made prior
false accusations of rape against her father, the defendant; trial judge erred in ruling such evidence collateral
because the evidence strongly contradicted the girl's story and showed that she was subject to
hallucinations). But see Peters v. State, 103 Ark. 119, 122-26 (1912) (trial judge did not err in refusing
to admit testimony, after complaining witness'ss denial, tending to show that the witness had a disposition
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further consideration of the relevance or probative value of the evidence
relative to the specific case at hand. Probative value is assumed to be high if
the accusation was false, rather than analyzed in relation to the evidence in the
subsequent case.19 If the complaining witness denies that the allegations were
made or that they were false, the defendant may then contradict her by
presenting extrinsic evidence to show that she is lying.20  In crimes other
than sexual assault, the ordinary rules of evidence apply when the defendant
seeks to impeach a witness for the prosecution by showing that the witness has
falsely accused others of crimes.2' The rules bar evidence of specific acts,
such as prior false statements, unless they are admissible under one of two
theories of relevance: (1) a non-character use of a prior bad act to show, for
example, a motive to fabricate false charges, or (2) character for
untruthfulness .' Impeachment for a motive to fabricate is a specific attack
on credibility, attempting to show that the witness has a specific reason for
lying in the case before the court, and that the proffered evidence will expose
the motivation.24 Impeachment for character for untruthfulness is a general,
to make false charges similar to the accusation on trial, which was an issue collateral to the charges against
the defendant and would have violated the rule that a witness may only be impeached by evidence of her
general reputation). The Peters decision was later severely criticized by Professor Wigmore, producing
an opposite result in a similar case 74 years later. West v. Arkansas, 719 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Ark. 1986),
reh'g denied, 722 S.W.2d 284 (Ark. 1987).
19. See, e.g., Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that focus for
purposes of admissibility is the falsity of the accusation); Cox v. State, 443 A.2d 607, 611 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1982) (applying the "credibility rule" to permit any inquiry relevant to the truthfulness of a witness);
People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 124-25 (Mich. 1984) (stating, without analysis, that prior false
accusations of rape are admissible, and implying that such accusations are similar to evidence of bias or
ulterior motive for testifying); People v. Williams, 477 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)(holding
prior false accusations of rape directly bear on the victim's credibility and the credibility of the victim's
accusations in a subsequent case); State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982) (questioning
whether one who has falsely accused another of rape has standing to claim she is harassed by evidence
of the false accusation, and holding that admission of such an accusation is more probative than prejudicial,
but exclusion in this case harmless); State v. Baron, 292 S.E.2d 741, 743 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
prior false accusations are admissible in order to attack credibility).
20. See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221, 222-23 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (quoting Wigmore
and Huriburt to support the notion that if prior false allegations were made, they are admissible because
they indicate a general scheme or pattern to make false charges or claims, relate to the state of mind of
the complainant and are substantive proof that the events charged did not occur); West v. Arkansas, 719
S.W.2d 684, 687 (Ark. 1986) (responding to specific criticism of a previous Arkansas decision by
Wigmore, held that prosecutrix may be cross-examined as to prior false allegations, and if denied,
allegations may be proven by extrinsic evidence); Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 89-90 (Nev. 1989) (alleged
victim's prior fabricated accusations of sexual abuse or sexual assault are highly probative of a complaining
witness'ss credibility on current charges and may be proved by extrinsic evidence, relying on Wigmore's
explanation of a dangerous abnormality found in female complainants); Clinebell v. Virginia, 368 S.E.2d
263, 265-66 (Va. 1988) (relying, inter alia, on Hurlburt and Wigmore to hold that, in the context of sex
offenses, a complaining witness may be cross-examined about prior false accusations, and if the witness
denies the conduct, it may be proved by extrinsic evidence).
21. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
22. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). For ease of discussion, I am using impeachment for a motive to fabricate
to refer to the non-exhaustive list of purposes for which specific acts of conduct may be admissible under
Rule 404(b) when offered for a non-character purpose. In addition to motive, these include such theories
as plan, modus operandi and so forth, which all receive the same evidentiary treatment under the rules.
23. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
24. See United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396, 1401-02 (W.D.N.C. 1991) (prior false
accusations admitted because they revealed ulterior motive of complainant to lie in subsequent case, as
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rather than specific, attack on credibility, seeking only to raise the inference
that because the witness lied on one occasion, she may be lying on this
occasion.75 The distinction between impeachment for motive to fabricate and
impeachment for character for untruthfulness is an important one because they
are subject to very different evidentiary treatment. Assuming an appropriate
nexus is shown between the proffered evidence and the theory of relevance,
evidence showing a specific motive to fabricate is always admissible and may
be constitutionally compelled.26 Evidence of character for untruthfulness,
however, has low probative value and is subject to strict regulation under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the corresponding state rules.27 It is, therefore,
necessary for the court to properly identify the nature of the evidence offered
so that the appropriate rules may be applied.
The special evidentiary rule for prior false accusations of rape does not
distinguish between evidence of specific acts offered to show motive to
fabricate and evidence offered for a character purpose. Instead, the evidence
is treated as if the theory of relevance is motive to fabricate, allowing the
defendant a much more liberal inquiry into the credibility of the complaining
witness. The practical effect is to raise the value of propensity
evidence-evidence that attempts to show that the witness is acting in
conformity with a character trait for untruthfulness-to a higher level in sexual
assault cases than in any other kind of crime.
It is true that, in some cases, prior false accusations of rape, like prior false
statements of witnesses in other crimes, are relevant on a motive to fabricate
theory. The familiar hypothetical in the prior false accusations of rape context
is that of the prostitute who repeatedly charges rape when her clients refuse
to pay for her services.28 Such evidence may be offered either as tending to
show a propensity to lie in similar circumstances under a character theory, or
as tending to show the prostitute's modus operandi.29 Modus operandi
usually refers to a "particularized and closely repetitive kind of conduct...
bordering on the habitual."30 Both theories of admissibility rely on the
notion that future conduct may be predicted from specific acts, but modus
operandi will generally be based on numerous like incidents. It carries more
weight than propensity evidence, 3 and may be constitutionally compelled
opposed to an attack on her general credibility); People v. Mascarenas, 21 Cal. App. 3d 660, 668 (1971)
(prior false accusation that complaining witness had charged another with furnishing narcotics was properly
admitted as relevant to an issue other than proof of character trait for lying).
25. See Stamper, 766 F. Supp. at 1401.
26. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-17 (1973) (distinguishing between general and specific attacks
on credibility, and recognizing that exposure of a witness'ss bias, prejudice, or ulterior motivation in
testifying is an important function of the constitutional right to cross-examination).
27. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6113.
28. Leon Letwin, "Unchaste Character, "Ideology, and the California Rape Laws, 54S. CAL. L. REV.
35, 74-77 (1980).
29. Id. at 74.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 75.
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if there is a probative relationship between the prior incidents and current
charges.32 A distinction should be made, however, between repetitive patterns
of false charges, admissible to show modus operandi, and prior false
accusations that may show only a propensity to lie. 3 The fact that a
complaining party in a rape case has lied about rape on a prior occasion may
be repetitive conduct, but it is not necessarily a pattern constituting a modus
operandi. 3
This paper does not challenge the admissibility and proof by extrinsic
evidence of prior false accusations of rape that are legitimate evidence of the
complaining witness's motive to fabricate her testimony in a subsequent
prosecution for sexual assault. Numerous, and sometimes extreme
hypotheticals, in which such evidence would be unquestionably admissible have
been so well rehearsed in the academic commentary and evidence casebooks
surrounding the enactment of rape shield laws that they need no further
discussion here.35 But if the theory of relevance is, in fact, character for
untruthfulness, character rules should strictly limit the inquiry into past events,
as they do in the prosecution of other kinds of crimes.
C. Character Evidence Rules
In general, character evidence is not admissible to show that the witness
acted in conformity with a certain character trait on a particular occasion.36
Despite this general prohibition, the rule is subject to numerous exceptions,37
including Rule 608,"s which permits an attack on the credibility of a witness
by showing a character for untruthfulness. In contrast to the common law in
many states prior to the codification of the rules of evidence,39 character for
32. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. at 1406 (sufficient relevant evidence going to the issue of the falsity of
three prior allegations of sexual abuse and the bias of the complainant in making the allegations to warrant
submission to the jury).
33. Letwin, supra note 28, at 74.
34. But see People v. Burrell-Hart, 237 Cal. Rptr. 654, 657 (Cal. App. 1987) (translating one incident
of doubtful similarity into a motive to lie).
35. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the
Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 914, 943-68 (1994) Ihereinafter The Lying Woman]; Berger, supra
note 11, at 57-69; Letwin, supra note 28, at 74-75.
36. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
37. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (permitting evidence that shows motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake); FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring the court
to weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect of evidence otherwise admissible); FED. R. EVID.
608(a) (permitting opinion and reputation evidence in limited circumstances); FED. R. EVID. 609
(controlling the admissibility of prior convictions for the purpose of attacking credibility).
38. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) provides in pertinent part:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the
witness's credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning
the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ....
39. Prior to the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts did not permit the introduction
of specific acts of misconduct, other than criminal convictions, to impeach the credibility of a witness, and
generally limited the inquiry to conduct relevant to veracity and honesty. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
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veracity or its opposite may now be shown on cross-examination through
inquiry concerning specific instances of conduct. While it is no longer limited
to opinion and reputation evidence, if the witness denies the conduct, extrinsic
evidence may not be introduced to rebut the denial.'
In jurisdictions in which rules similar to the federal rules have been
adopted, Rule 608(b) is controlling when specific acts are proffered to impeach
for a character purpose. The rule permits a witness to be asked on cross-
examination about specific instances of conduct.
The court must first find, however, that such acts are probative of the
witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and specific acts may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 4 Even if the terms of 608(b) are
satisfied, evidence may still be excluded under Rule 40342 if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion
of the issues, or by the length of time that would be necessary to explore the
issue. The practice that follows from 608(b) is that, assuming the threshold
inquiry is satisfied and the question allowed, the questioner must take the
answer of the witness. If the answer is a denial of the questioner's allegations,
no other documentary or testimonial evidence may be offered in contradiction
of the witness. 4" The ultimate effect of 608(b) is to strictly limit the use of
specific act evidence to impeach the witness's character for veracity."
D. The Special Rule for Sexual Assault Cases and Rape Mythology
No consistent evidentiary theory is advanced to support the admission of
prior false accusations of rape and their proof by extrinsic evidence. Some
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 608[05] (1990). FED. R. EVID. 608(b) and similar state
rules permit the introduction of specific acts, if the court first finds that the acts bear on a witness'ss
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6111.
40. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 55 (1984); see FED. R. EVID. 405, 608(b).
41. The federal rules of evidence, while barring the use of specific acts evidence to show that a witness
acted in conformity with a certain character trait, permit specific acts evidence if introduced to show
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. FED. R. EVID.
404(b), 608(b). If a prior false allegation of sexual assault fits within one of these exceptions, it is
admissible, as long as it passes the probative value versus prejudice balancing test of Rule 403,
notwithstanding Rule 608(b). Rule 608(b) is addressed solely to the introduction of evidence to show
character for truthfulness.
42. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 808 F.2d 969, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1987) (where witness denied
forging check, Rule 608(b) would have precluded introduction of the check to impeach the witness); United
States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977) (trial court
erred in admitting, during cross-examination of witness, written evidence of fraud suit denied by witness).
But see Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1980) (if witness admits acts alleged by cross-
examiner, documentary evidence of acts may be admitted because not inconsistent with any underlying
policy of Rule 608(b)).
44. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
1995]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
courts simply ignore the restrictions on extrinsic evidence or sweep them aside
with reference to the longstanding history of exceptions in sex cases.45 Others
mischaracterize the prior false accusations as substantive evidence to avoid the
character rules and admit the evidence as demonstrative of a motive to
fabricate. 4 Frequently, the Confrontation Clause is invoked to hold that
evidence of prior false allegations is constitutionally compelled, thereby
overcoming any restrictions imposed by evidence rules.47
Whatever the theory of admissibility advanced, at least one commentator
has suggested that courts have been willing to break or ignore the rules because
they have recognized the "high probative value" of the evidence. 48 But this
assertion glosses over a major question: why is a prior false allegation of
sexual assault so highly probative of the current charge that special rules
should require its admission and proof by extrinsic evidence? In other words,
what is there about a prior false allegation of sexual assault that is different
from other evidence found to bear on a witness's truthfulness? One would
expect to find the answer in the cases advancing the exception, but it is rarely
given in the case law and it does not exist in the brief commentary on this
subject. 49 An examination of the historical development of the exception
through the case law, however, shows that the evidentiary treatment of prior
false accusations of rape is grounded in rape mythology. The exact origin of
the exception is unclear, but one may find case law dating from as early as
1888, which applied a different rule on character evidence in sex cases, as well
as commentary in evidence treatises describing the manner in which courts
have carved out a special exception for such cases.50
The rules on character evidence prevent a searching inquiry into the
complaining party's mental and social history. As late as the 1970 edition,
Wigmore's treatise on evidence argued strongly that in any criminal charge
of a sex offense or in any civil suit involving seduction or illegitimacy, these
rules should not apply when the complaining party is a woman.5' While
45. See Hall v. State, 374 N.E.2d 62, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (determining that evidence of victim's
credibility should be allowed); People v. Mikula, 269 N.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (same);
Galvin, supra note 9, at 860. See also Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); State
v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); Cox v. State, 443 A.2d 607, 613 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1982); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991-92 (Mass. 1978); Miller v. State, 779
P.2d 87, 89 (Nev. 1989); State v. Durham, 327 S.E.2d 920, 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Baron,
292 S.E.2d 741, 743 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Boggs, 588 N.E.2d 813, 816 (Ohio 1992); State v.
LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 613 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 263, 264-65
(Va. 1988).
46. Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); People v. Hurlburt, 333 P.2d 82,
86-87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Smith v. State, 377 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga. 1989).
47. See infra note 111.
48. Galvin, supra note 9, at 861.
49. But see State v. Boggs, 624 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (excluding evidence of alleged
rape victim's prior false rape accusations at evidentiary hearing did not violate defendant's constitutional
rights to confrontation, cross-examination, or due process).
50. See People v. Evans, 40 N.W. 473, 478 (Mich. 1888). See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 196
(Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
51. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 924b. Wigmore also believed that no sex offense charge should go
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Wigmore had a general fear that innocent men were vulnerable to false charges
of rape,52 he came to focus on "female types of excessive or perverted
sexuality," and relied on modern psychiatry to support his belief that a
woman's chastity is related to a woman's veracity.
53
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young
girls and women who come before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their
psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects
• . . diseased derangements or abnormal instincts . . . bad social
environment.., temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One
form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of
sexual offenses by men. The unchaste . . . mentality finds . . . direct
expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the
narrator is the heroine or the victim .... The real victim ... too often
54in such cases is the innocent man ....
Wigmore's editors maintain that he was not the first legal scholar to
emphasize the danger of rape charges without foundation,55 referring the
reader to the Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale, whose views on the judicial
caution to be exercised in favor of an accused rapist are well known.56
Certainly, Wigmore had company among judges and legal scholars,57 but
Wigmore's treatise is the one cited in modern cases to support deviations from
current evidence rules that limit the admissibility of specific acts and bar their
proof by extrinsic evidence.58 One may argue that Wigmore's statements were
directed at a small class of women and girls, but Wigmore's gender-biased
perspective on character evidence in sex cases, dressed up in pseudo-scientific
jargon, 59 has broadly influenced court decisions in this area.
If there is any one case that has furthered Wigmore's ideas in the context
of prior false allegations of rape, it is People v. Hurlburt.60 In this case, the
to the jury "unless the female complainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and
testified to by a qualified physician." Id. § 924a.
52. See Berger, supra note 10, at 21 (quoting case law and other legal scholars whose response to
rape cases was guided by the overriding fear of false charges). Wigmore, in particular, expressed the view
that an innocent man's liberty was at "the mercy of an unscrupulous and revengeful mistress." I JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 200, at 683 (3d ed. 1940).
53. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 924a, at 737.
54. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 924a, at 736.
55. See IA JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 62, n.2 (3d ed. 1940)
(referring reader to 1 LORD CHIEF JUSTICE MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (lst
Am. ed. 1847), and arguing that Wigmore, born in the nineteenth century, was a creature of his times
whose views should be judged in that context).
56. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 413-14.
57. Berger, supra note 10, at 25-27.
58. See id. at 27-28 (noting that because of his academic stature, Wigmore's works have been given
disproportionate weight on matters of proof in rape cases).
59. 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5387,
at 579 (1980).
60. 333 P.2d 82, 86 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). See also Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221, 222 (Ala.
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defendant was charged with lewd conduct with a nine year-old girl. At trial,
the defendant was refused permission to cross-examine the girl or to introduce
evidence that she had made similar charges against two other men. The offer
of proof for one of the charges was that she admitted she had lied. The ground
for exclusion was the common law rule that a witness's character for veracity
could not be impeached by evidence of particular, wrongful acts, but only by
opinion or reputation evidence. In its reversal, the appellate court relied on
both Lord Hale and Wigmore, holding that, in sex cases, exceptions to the
ordinary rules were longstanding and the widest possible latitude should be
allowed in making such evidentiary decisions, for the philosophical reasons
expressed by these commentators." Indeed, the California court viewed the
evidence as admissible not just for the purpose of impeachment, but to
disprove the charge before the court, apparently adopting Wigmore's view that
a prior false allegation indicates a corrupt mind.62 In that light, the court
considered this evidence more probative than evidence of bias and motive,
which is always admissible.6 3
Despite the antiquated tone and outright expression of gender bias, the
Hurlburt decision and Wigmore's treatise continue to be relied on by other
courts addressing this issue in more recent times. For example, in Phillips v.
State, issued in 1989, the court relied on Wigmore and Hurlburt to support
the notion that if prior false allegations were made, they are admissible because
Crim. App. 1989); Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); West v. State, 719
S.W.2d 684, 687 (Ark. 1986), reh'g denied, 722 S.W.2d 284 (Ark. 1987); State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d
193, 200 (Mont. 1984); Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (Nev. 1989).
61. Hurlburt, 333 P.2d at 85.
62. Id. at 87. See WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 963, at 808-12, on habitual false charges and sundry
corrupt conduct. Although Wigmore recognized the evidentiary distinction between "conduct indicating
a corrupt moral character in general and conduct indicating a specific corrupt intention for the case in
hand," he clearly believed that prior false accusations of sexual assault indicated a corrupt mind. Id. at
810. Therefore, the character rules prohibiting the admission of specific acts evidence should not apply.
He warned:
[T]he court-room has its quota of false claimants and pretended victims of wrongs; some
are children, some eccentrics, some hysterics, some insane, some nymphomaniacs, some
conscious blackmailers. It is hard enough, at last, to detect and expose them....
The double barrier erected by our strict precedents in this field may be instanced by the
case nowadays common in our courts, a charge against an oldish man of indecencies with a young
girl or child in his shop or house. Usually the facts are either that the man is a sexual pervert,
or that the female is a sexual hysteric or a precocious little reprobate. If the former case, the
prosecution tries to show that the man has a habit of treating little girls in that way. But, NO,
that cannot be done; the character rule forbids. If the latter case, the defence tries to show that
the girl has been falsely charging other men with similar offenses. But, NO, that cannot be done;
the witness-rule forbids. And so, whichever the truth may be, the court ties up the case in these
intellectual ropes, and lets the parties struggle away with the fragments of evidence that are
permitted to be used. And yet we assume that this process is a skilled and worthy effort to
establish the truth!
Id. at 811-12.
63. Hurlburt, 333 P.2d at 87. By viewing the evidence as admissible "substantively," the court found
another justification for its admissibility without regard to the rules on impeachment. See Galvin, supra
note 9, at 860 (courts have used the substantive versus impeachment distinction to avoid the rules on
character evidence). Later cases pick up the distinction between permitting the evidence for substantive
versus impeachment purposes, but aside from the avoidance of character rules, the distinction is
insignificant to the jury.
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they indicate a general pattern of making false charges. 64 Because the court
accepted the idea that a woman who has made a prior false allegation has a
corrupt mind, it concluded that the false charges were substantive proof that
the current events in question did not occur.65 In Miller v. State, also issued
in 1989, the court relied on Wigmore's explanation of a dangerous abnormality
found in female complainants in sex cases to hold that an alleged victim's prior
false accusations of sexual assault were so probative of her credibility that the
defendant was entitled to prove them by extrinsic evidence.66
One of the most backward-looking decisions comes from the Supreme
Court of Arkansas in West v. Arkansas.7 The defendant in that case was
convicted of sexual abuse, based on the testimony of the victim, a fifteen-year-
old girl. She testified that the defendant, with whom she was slightly
acquainted, drove her to a deserted area and then assaulted her by squeezing
her breast and kissing her neck.6' The defense attempted to cross-examine
the victim about similar accusations she had supposedly made against two other
men. The defense also asked to call three witnesses who it claimed would
testify that the victim had once made a similar charge against her uncle, who
had denied it, and that once at a concert she had reported someone attempting
to touch her breast, but that the person was not found. The trial court excluded
both the cross-examination and the testimony. 69 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas reversed the conviction, adopting the Hurlburt rule permitting the
cross-examination of the witness to show that she made the allegations and that
they were false.70
The decision in West, issued in 1986, came 74 years after the same court's
decision in Peters v. State.71 Peters had upheld a trial judge's refusal to admit
testimony showing that the complaining witness in a rape case had a disposition
to make false charges similar to the accusation on trial. 72 The ground for
exclusion was that the evidence was collateral and its admission would have
violated the common law rule barring impeachment by specific acts.73 In
affirming the trial court, the Peters court stated that the evidence would only
be admissible to show that the prosecutrix was "mentally deranged, or that she
was of a weak mind, or that she was subject to hallucinations. " 74 In the 1970
edition of his treatise, Wigmore criticized the holding of the case as dangerous,
recommending that the court review that section of his work that discussed
several articles by psychiatrists and other commentators in asserting that some
64. 545 So. 2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
65. Id.
66. 779 P.2d 87, 89-90 (Nev. 1989).
67. 719 S.W.2d 684 (Ark. 1986).
68. Id. at 685-88.
69. Id. at 686.
70. Id. at 686-87.
71. 146 S.W. 491 (Ark. 1912).
72. Id. at 492.
73. Id. at 492-99.
74. Id. at 493.
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women and girls have fantasies about being attacked by men, which then
induces them to make false accusations. 7' The West court noted Wigmore's
"required reading" suggestion, stating "[w]e agree with Wigmore's basic
criticism of our holding in Peters."76 That rape mythology is still operative
in the application of evidentiary rules is apparent when one considers that it
took a sweeping effort at reform, only twenty years ago, to place the
defendant, rather than the victim, on trial for rape. 77 The problem was not
with the evidence rules as they were written, but with how judges applied them
at their discretion at trial.7 To effect reform, rape shield statutes had to
contain language that limited the judge's discretion to find certain evidence
relevant. As a consequence, there are now legislative declarations of the
irrelevance of certain classes of information about the complaining witness,
most notably sexual history.79 Even so, judges retain enormous discretion to
interpret the exceptions to rape shield statutes and the defendant's constitutional
rights in a manner that can limit the effect of the legislation.,o
Here, too, the problem with the admission of prior false allegations of rape
is not with the way evidence rules are written, or even with the rules as they
were understood prior to codification, but with their application to particular
cases through the exercise of judicial discretion. One would expect that, by
applying the ordinary rules on character evidence, judges would be forced to
conduct a contextual analysis of the evidence before the court.'. As is so
convincingly demonstrated by the avoidance of the character rules, however,
"the way [judges] think about the evidence they hear is more important than
any rule."82 If a judge is biased by rape myths, the labels assigned to the
proffered prior allegations will reflect those myths, 3  and no rule will bar
their admission.
The inadequacy of rules alone to control gender bias in the admission of
this kind of evidence is dramatically illustrated by State v. Cox,' a rape case
that was reversed and remanded because of the exclusion of a prior false
75. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 963, at 808.
76. West, 719 S.W.2d at 687.
77. Peter M. Hazelton, Rape Shield Laws: Limits on Zealous Advocacy, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 35, 51
(1991).
78. See Vaught & Henning, supra note 2, at 901 (noting that myths and misconceptions concerning
women and sexuality were incorporated in the interpretation of evidentiary rules, including the myth that
women would falsely accuse men of rape and that chastity was a character trait, reflecting society's
pervading concern for men's rather than women's interests).
79. See statutes cited supra note 8; see also Ann Althouse, Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape
Shield Rules Matter?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 762 (1992) [hereinafter Thelma and Louise].
80. Thelma and Louise, supra note 79, at 766; see also Andrew Z. Soshnick, Comment, The Rape
Shield Paradox: Complainant Protection Amidst Oscillating Trends of State Judicial Interpretation, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 644 passim (1987) (discussing judicial interpretations of rape shield laws that
are contrary to plain meaning and legislative intent).
81. Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 59, 75 (arguing that analysis of probative value requires context).
82. Thelma and Louise, supra note 79, at 768.
83. Id. at 761.
84. 468 A.2d 319, 322 (Md. 1983).
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allegation of rape. The decision did not rely on the exception to character
evidence rules that has been prevalent in sex cases, and the court made it clear
that the inquiry on remand would be limited to cross-examination if the witness
denied the allegation.8 5 Instead, the court operated under the "general rule
that any witness may be cross-examined on matters and facts affecting his
credibility, so long as such facts are not immaterial or irrelevant to the issue
being tried."86 The conviction was reversed for the same reason that has
operated in the cases that have relied on the Hurlburt rule that a prior false
allegation of rape made by the complaining party is highly probative of her
credibility and therefore "relevant" to the case at bar. 7 The concurring
opinion tellingly framed the relevance question:
Would it be relevant for the trier of fact, in deciding whether to believe
the victim's accusation of Cox, to know that she had once before
caused another man to be criminally charged with assault, that she had
repeated that accusation under oath at the man's trial, and that on
cross-examination she had recanted, thus at least tacitly admitting that
(1) she had falsely accused the man, and (2) she had lied under oath?
There is no reasonable way that question can be answered in the
negative. That is why the conviction must be reversed."8
The judge may be quite right that most triers of fact would agree that the
answer to the relevance question is yes, but it can only be relevant if one
accepts the premise that women have a propensity to make false charges of
rape. 9
One lone dissenter took up a contextual analysis.90 In weighing the
probative value of the collateral matter, the dissent argues, the trial judge must
review it within the range of the litigated controversy and the evidence.9'
Here, the rape was so brutal that the corpus delicti was not contested. The sole
issue litigated at trial was the victim's identification of the defendant as the
perpetrator. The defendant's proffer was that the complaining witness had
accused her boyfriend of rape and recanted under cross-examination during
the prosecution of the case. Although it was true that the victim's lie involved
a rape case, it had to do with whether she was assaulted within the context of
85. Id. at 324-25.
86. Id. at 322. See also Cox v. State, 443 A.2d 607, 618 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (Lowe, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the rule as stated by the majority because it removes all discretion from the trial
judge to decide what is properly within the sphere of cross-examination), aff'd, 468 A.2d 319 (Md. 1983).
87. Cox, 443 A.2d at 613.
88. Id. at 617.
89. See Torrey, supra note 2, at 1047. Torrey discusses the behavioral science literatureand concludes
that jurors fit the facts of the case into the fundamental premises they already believe to be true. "Jurors
will strive to reach a verdict in a rape case that will not conflict strongly with the rape myth cognitions
they hold at the beginning of the trial." Id. at 1050.
90. Cox, 443 A.2d at 617.
91. Id. at 618-22.
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a consensual relationship. She did not lie about the assailant's identity.
Therefore, the dissent argues that the trial judge was correct in exercising his
discretion to exclude a single indiscretion that implied no propensity for
untruthfulness, and that had potential to lead to "such time-consuming and
distracting explanations that even the uncontested corpus delicti issue may be
obscured."92 Moreover, other evidence pointing to the defendant as the
perpetrator was strong. The victim knew the defendant's identity before the
attack, and therefore was not identifying a stranger from a line-up.93 The
defendant had been apprehended shortly after the crime, and the condition of
his clothes and body corroborated the victim's story. The perpetrator had also
told the victim during the crime, by way of explanation, that he had just been
released from jail and that he had not had a woman for six months. These facts
were consistent with the defendant's recent whereabouts. After considering all
of the evidence in some detail, including an alibi of the defendant that placed
him in the vicinity of the crime with an opportunity to commit it, the dissent
concluded that it was inconceivable that the victim's recanted charge against
a boyfriend suggested that she was mistaken now about the identity of her
assailant.94 He summarized the propensity issue by asking "Where is there
a single case cited . . . by the majority holding that a victim's past may be
scoured for a single suggestio falsi, however irrelevant, which may then be
used to becloud the issue before the fact finder? " "
The Cox decision was upheld on further appeal for essentially the same
reasons as those stated by the intermediate appellate court-that attacking the
credibility of the complaining witness was critical to the defendant's case and
that the proffered question went to the heart of that issue, but the "heart of the
issue" is merely assumed, not probed.96
The problem is not with the rules per se, but with the judicial lens through
which the rules, no matter how they are drafted, are applied. Whether the
court is assessing character for truthfulness, relevance, or probative value, the
conclusion that must be drawn from a review of the Hurlburt line of cases and
others, like Cox, is that the judicial lens frequently is clouded by rape
mythology when it confronts a prior false allegation of rape.
The precedent is not uniform, however, in its refusal to challenge the
notion that a prior false accusation of rape is always probative of credibility
on subsequent charges. At least some courts are moving towards considering
92. Id. at 619.
93. Id. at 622. The complaining witness' prior knowledge of the defendant did not indicate anything
other than that she knew who he was. There was no suggestion that prior knowledge or relationship created
a motive to fabricate.
94. Given the large number of cases in which women have, out of fear of retribution, fear of loss of
support, or other reasons, recanted accusations of assault by their partners, we should be skeptical of the
proposition that it was the accusation, rather than the recantation, that was untruthful.
95. Cox, 443 A.2d at 622.
96. State v. Cox, 468 A.2d 319, 324 (Md. 1983).
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such evidence absent the gender biased attitude that has too often been a
component of the judicial response.
For example, in Hughes v. Raines,97 a defendant convicted of sexual
assault brought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court claiming that he had
been denied his right to confront witnesses by the trial judge's refusal to permit
certain cross-examination. The proffered testimony was that the complaining
witness had accused another man of attempted rape, that the man had denied
it, and that the district attorney did not prosecute. Aside from the sufficiency
of the proffer, which the federal court found inadequate to show falsity, the
court noted that the relevance of the evidence to the case in chief was slight.9
It characterized the inference to be drawn by the jury as a propensity to lie and
noted that the evidence rules reflect a reluctance to draw an inference about
character from evidence of specific conduct.99
Moreover, the court reasoned that the dissimilarity of the two incidents
negated the inference. " The prior incident involved sexual conduct which
occurred on a date. At issue was the extent of the woman's consent. In this
case, the defendant was accused of driving the complaining party to an isolated
location, throwing her to the ground, ripping off her clothes, and physically
struggling with her before giving up and leaving her obviously injured. The
court concluded that exploring the first incident would have added collateral
issues with very little probative value.'01
Similarly, in State v. Boggs, °2 the court found that there was no
inference of a propensity to lie to be drawn from the mere fact that a rape
victim made a prior false allegation. Although the court remanded the case for
an in camera hearing to determine whether the proffered evidence involved
prior sexual conduct that would be excluded by Ohio's rape shield law, it made
clear that if the allegations were found to be false and were probative of the
witness's veracity only cross-examination would be allowed. 03 Viewing such
allegations as entirely collateral, the court stated that it knew of no case law
that applied a different rule on extrinsic evidence for witnesses testifying in
cases of murder, arson, burglary, or robbery.0 4
The courts that expressly adopt Wigmore's views on a woman's propensity
to lie in sex cases are the minority of the more recent decisions of state and
federal courts. But the fact remains that many modern courts, whether or not
they mention Wigmore or Hurlburt, use the Hurlburt rule.105 To accept the
97. 641 F.2d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 1981).
98. Id. at 792-93.
99. Id. at 793.
100. Id.
101. See also United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1088 (8th Cir. 1988) (circumstances of two
instances of alleged rape were so dissimilar that probative value of inference that complaining witness lied
about first instance, and therefore, was lying about second instance, was minimal).
102. 588 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ohio 1992).
103. Id. at 818.
104. See id. at 817.
105. See cases cited supra note 20.
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rule-that a prior false allegation of rape is so highly probative of the victim's
credibility that it should be subject to special evidentiary rules-is to accept
the myth that women have a propensity to falsely accuse men of rape. The
myth serves as a substitute for an analysis of probative value.
To the extent that there has been any academic comment on the subject,
the thinking is consistent with the case law, although the justification is likely
to be framed in constitutional terms. Commentators assume that evidence of
prior allegations of rape is presumptively admissible if false,"° but there is
no apparent recognition that the underlying assumption of its probative value
might be gender biased. 7 Indeed, because its probative value is not
challenged, no analysis is given.'0 8 The only rationale for not analyzing
whether a prior false accusation truly shows a character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness in a specific case is the commentator's belief that women will
lie about sexual assault and that their charges must be more seriously
scrutinized than those of witnesses in other contexts."° If this mythology is
operative, no further analysis is necessary and the confrontation clause is an
easy trump card to play." 0
E. Character Evidence and Constitutional Requirements
The Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment,"' made applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment," 2 is frequently advanced to
justify the admissibility of prior false accusations of rape."' Sixth
106. See Galvin, supra note 9, at 858 (noting that "lo]ne would be hard-pressed to dispute the high
probative value of evidence that on previous occasions the complainant had made false allegations of rape");
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 59, § 5387 at 580 ("If the defendant's right to a fair trial means anything,
surely he must have the right to introduce evidence that the victim has previously made similar accusations
against others that were proved to be false"); Pamela J. Fisher, State v. Alvey: Iowa's Victimization of
Defendants Through the Overextension of Iowa's Rape Shield Law, 76 IOWA L. REV. 835, 845-46 (1991)
(arguing that the Iowa Supreme Court erred in not permitting an alleged prior false allegation of rape to
be introduced at the defendant's rape trial, even though the evidence was very much disputed and remote
in time).
107. But see Thelma and Louise, supra note 79, at 757-58.
108. See Galvin, supra note 9, at 860. Galvin recognizes that relevance depends on falsity, but once
a prior allegation is determined false, she accepts it as highly probative without a contextual analysis.
109. Galvin, supra note 9, at 858-59. Galvin begins her brief commentary on prior false allegations
of rape with the true story of a woman's recantation of an accusation of rape, a charge on which the
defendant had spent considerable time in prison, which indicates that she sees the complaining party in that
case as a prototype for all complaining parties. This is simply another version of Lord Hale's view that
courts ought to view complaining parties in rape cases with extraordinary suspicion. See WIGMORE
(Chadbourn), supra note 7. Galvin's justification is that the complaining witness'ss credibility is the central
issue in a rape case and that the jury has nothing to rely on but opposing versions of the alleged events.
Id. at 861. But see infra notes 146-58 and accompanying text (discussing why a credibility contest between
the complaining witness and the accused does not justify abandonment of the character evidence rules solely
in rape cases).
110. See Thelma and Louise, supra note 79, at 766.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
112. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
113. Covington v. Alaska, 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Smith v. State, 377 S.E.2d
158, 159-60 (Ga. 1989); State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Hackett,
365 N.W.2d 120, 123-25 (Mich. 1984); People v. Williams, 477 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991);
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amendment rights guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to present witnesses in one's favor, by
virtue of the compulsory process clause." 4 In cross-examining a witness, the
defendant must be allowed to test the credibility of the witness and the
witness's knowledge of the facts." 5
In the context of prior false accusations of rape, the constitutional argument
is based on the view that the evidence is probative of the complaining witness's
credibility, and, therefore, defendants should be permitted to cross-examine
and present extrinsic evidence to prove that the complaining witness lied about
rape on a previous occasion. It is unconstitutional, so the argument goes, to
allow an evidentiary rule, such as the restriction on extrinsic evidence, to
defeat the sixth amendment right of the defendant to attack credibility.
The leading case on which the constitutional argument rests is Davis v.
Alaska, in which the Supreme Court held that the state's policy underlying the
confidentiality of juvenile court records did not justify the exclusion of the
juvenile record in the face of the confrontation clause. 116 In Davis, which
involved a prosecution for burglary, the defense attempted to introduce a
witness's juvenile court records, to show that the witness was on probation for
burglary. The defense wanted to use the juvenile records to suggest that the
witness may have been pressured to make identifications in order to shift
attention away from himself and out of fear of probation revocation." 7
The Court distinguished between an attack on the general credibility of the
witness and one directed toward "revealing possible biases, prejudices or
ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or
personalities in the case at hand.""'8 The juvenile record was admissible as
evidence because it was intended to show bias and prejudice." 9 Although
the Davis decision was limited to impeachment for bias, a number of state
jurisdictions have apparently viewed it as compelling the introduction of prior
false accusations of rape, and their proof by extrinsic evidence, to attack
credibility generally. 2
State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982); People v. Mandel, 401 N.E.2d 185, 186 (N.Y.
1979); State v. Hendricks, 791 P.2d 139, 140 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 614-16
(Or. Ct. App. 1986); Thomas v. State, 669 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Clinebell v. Virginia,
368 S.E.2d 263, 266 (Va. 1988).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . ." Id. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 10, at
556 (compulsory process clause includes the right to call, not merely subpoena, witnesses in defendant's
behalf).
115. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
316-17 (1974).
116. 415 U.S. at 316.
117. Id. at 311.
118. Id. at 316.
119. Id. at 317.
120. See cases cited supra note 113.
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Since Davis, the Supreme Court has clarified sixth amendment rights when
those rights are opposed to a state evidentiary rule or rule of procedure.
2 1
In the rape shield context, the Supreme Court held in Michigan v. Lucas that
defendant Lucas's right to confront witnesses and to present a defense were
not absolute, and could be limited to "accommodate other legitimate interests
in the criminal trial process. "122 The legitimate interest that overcame the
defendant's rights in Lucas was a notice and hearing provision in Michigan's
rape shield statute requiring the defense to tell the prosecution of its intent to
introduce evidence of a prior sexual relationship between the complaining
witness and the accused. The trial court excluded the proffered testimony
because the defense failed to give notice. The Court rejected what it viewed
as a per se rule prohibiting preclusion of the defendant's evidence as not
constitutionally required by the sixth amendment. 123 Relying on Delaware
v. Van Arsdall,124 the Court explained that trial courts have broad discretion
to limit a defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses based on a host of
concerns, including harassment of witnesses, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
and exclusion of cumulative or marginally relevant evidence."2 The
touchstone is whether the restriction is arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purpose it is designed to serve.
26
The admission of prior false accusations of rape, offered for a character
purpose, does not present a complex constitutional question under Davis or
subsequent cases. The potential clash between the rules of evidence and the
confrontation clause occurs primarily because of analytical mistakes. The first
and most obvious mistake is the failure of courts to identify those prior
accusations offered solely to show propensity to lie as a question of character
evidence, that are subject to restrictions and are generally of low probative
value. Instead, courts have classified the evidence as an attack on "credibility,"
and have viewed the defendant's right to attack credibility as sacrosanct,
without making the distinction between an attack for bias and an attack on
general character. 
2 7
121. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407-09 (1988) (imposition of discovery sanction); Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (arbitrary exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony); United States
v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975) (court's discretion in not limiting defense investigator's testimony);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (impeachment of own witness).
122. 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (quoting Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973))).
123. Id. at 152.
124. 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).
125. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149.
126. Rock, 483 U.S. at 56.
127. People v. Sheperd, 551 P.2d 210, 212 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Cox, 468 A.2d 319, 322
(Md. 1983); People v. Williams, 477 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Caswell, 320
N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982); State v. Baron, 292 S.E.2d 741, 743 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); State v.
LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 614 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); State v. McCarthy, 446 A.2d 1034, 1034-35 (R.I. 1982)
(per curiam); Clinebell v. Virginia, 368 S.E.2d 263, 266 (Va. 1988).
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Second, in decisions like Hurlburt,'28 and those expressly viewing the
complaining witness's prior false accusation as an indication of a "corrupt
mind" or other mental defect,129 again there is a misidentification of
character evidence, but with a particularly gender-biased twist. There, without
any analysis of the probative value of the prior accusation, courts have
accepted the evidence as substantive proof that the subsequent crime did not
occur, rather than as an attack on credibility of either a general or specific
nature. They have done so by generalizing Wigmore's view-that there exists
a defective class of females prone to fantasizing sexual encounters and falsely
accusing innocent men of rape-to any complaining witness who has made a
false allegation in the past. If a prior false accusation is proffered, these courts
apparently reason it must be coming from a defective female. By describing
the evidence as substantive, the restrictions on extrinsic or collateral evidence
are neatly avoided. 30 In reality, the evidence in Hulburt, and later decisions
relying on it, is an attack on general credibility that should be identified as
character evidence, because there is no probative relationship between the prior
accusation and the present crime other than a propensity to engage in the
character trait of lying. Of course, if the facts of these cases actually showed
mental illness resulting in a pattern of false charges, the decisions would be
justified, but "common sense warps to myth when society comes to view
extreme types of women as prototypes of the rape complainant." 3'
The third mistake couits make is to equate falsity with probative value, so
that falsity, and not probative value, determines admissibility.'32 Indeed,
analysis of probative value might have ameliorated the characterization
mistakes. However expansively one defines sixth amendment rights to cross-
examine and present testimony, evidence must be related to the issues involved
in the case before the exclusion properly takes on a constitutional
dimension.'33 In other words, like probative value, the right to confrontation
may be defined in the abstract, but its violation must be judged in light of
specific deprivations.' 34 When falsity is unanalytically equated with probative
value, it appears that rape mythology, in particular, the myth that women have
a neurotic propensity to lie about sexual assault, is operative.
128. People v. Hulburt, 333 P.2d 82 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
129. See cases cited supra note 20.
130. Galvin, supra note 9, at 860-61.
131. Berger, supra note 10, at 25.
132. See cases cited supra note 20. 1 do not overlook the fact that honesty is a generally held cultural
value and that witnesses who have lied about anything in their past lives are going to be viewed with
suspicion, quite apart from adding cultural myths about rape. Both may be operating in the minds of judges
when they approach these admissibility questions, but this is precisely why such evidence is regulated.
See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 104.
133. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 10, at 557.
134. See, e.g., Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1980) (confrontation clause does
not prevent the trial court from weighing the offer of proof to determine its probative value to the trier
of fact and its probable effect on fair and efficient conduct of the trial).
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When viewed without the kinds of analytical mistakes discussed above,
attempts to prove prior false accusations of rape will generally be seen to be
proffers of evidence of character for untruthfulness, which is an attack on
general credibility.' 35 Such evidence is of low probative value, and the
Confrontation Clause does not compel its admission and its proof by extrinsic
evidence under any decision of the Supreme Court. 136 Whether the admission
of a prior false accusation of rape is constitutionally compelled depends
entirely on the purpose for which the evidence is relevant. The constitution
is implicated only if it is relevant for a non-character purpose.' t 7 The sixth
amendment cannot be abridged by the exclusion of irrelevant evidence. t38
Therefore, rules similar to 608(b), which prohibit the introduction of extrinsic
evidence of collateral matters, will not unconstitutionally stand in the way of
the defendant's presentation of his case, and it is unnecessary to engage in a
comparison of the state interests in the evidentiary rule excluding it versus the
defendant's sixth amendment rights.1
39
II. PRIOR FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF RAPE UNDER 608(b)
There is no logical reason to favor the admission of prior false allegations
of rape by treating them outside the restrictions of 608(b) as a separate species
of character evidence. First, there is nothing special about the crime of rape
that makes evidence of the victim's propensity to make false allegations more
valuable or necessary in rape cases. Second, even if the prior allegation is
false, it should not be admitted without an analysis of probative value and
potential prejudicial effect. Third, the focus on falsity requires pretrial hearings
in which the complaining witness is placed on trial to determine her veracity.
Finally, character evidence is subject to restrictions because of the dangers
inherent in its introduction, which may be heightened in a rape case.
135. See, e.g., Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (it is an attack on general
credibility to ask the jury to draw an inference that because the complaining witness lied on a previous
occasion about rape, her subsequent accusation in another case is false).
136. United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1089 (8th Cir. 1988) (prior false allegation was offered
solely to attack the general credibility of the witness and its admission was not constitutionally compelled);
Hughes, 641 F.2d at 793 (admission of prior false accusation of rape was not constitutionally compelled
where attack was on general credibility of the witness); State v. DeSantis, 456 N.W.2d 600, 609 (Wis.
1990) (exclusion of prior allegedly untruthful allegation did not violate the confrontation clause as the
evidence of highly prejudicial and had little probative value).
137. See United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396, 1403-04 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
138. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (exclusion of marginally relevant evidence does
not violate the sixth amendment); see also State v. Patnaude, 438 A.2d 402, 404-11 (Vt. 1981).
139. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. at 1403-04 (discussing the balancing of the state's and the complaining
witness'ss interests versus the defendant's when prior false accusations are offered to show a motive to
fabricate that is probative evidence in the subsequent case). See also Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 10,
at 565-89 (analyzing the state interests in rape shield statutes versus the defendant's right to present a
defense); Lara E. Simmons, Michigan v. Lucas: Failing to Define the State Interest in Rape Shield
Legislation, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1592passim (1992) (discussing Supreme Court's failure to adequately define
state interest in rape prosecutions as opposed to defendant's sixth amendment rights).
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Therefore, it is not an area of evidence law in which the discretion of courts
should be unguided.
A. Rape Versus Robbery
Although the prosecution of rape has been subject to special rules that have
set it apart from other crimes like burglary or robbery, there is nothing about
the crime itself that elevates the value of evidence of the victim's propensity
to make false accusations. Generally, most jurisdictions exclude evidence when
it is offered against a criminal defendant solely to show that the defendant
acted in conformity with a certain propensity in committing a crime."
Evidentiary issues in rape cases have been treated differently from other crimes
of personal assault both because of wholly unwarranted, stereotypical
assumptions regarding the psychology and behavior of sexual assault
complainants and because of the erroneous belief that it is inherently more
difficult to expose a liar in a rape case than in any other crime."' The latter
justification is derived from the notion that the supposed outrage and sympathy
for the victim would unfairly tip the balance of the scales toward the
prosecution.142 These myths have spawned many different aberrations in both
substantive law and evidence. "' When that mythology is stripped away, the
complaining witness's credibility should be no more of an issue in the
prosecution of a rape than it is in the prosecution of a robbery.
Both rape and robbery may be described as "nonconsensual and forcible
version[s] of ordinary human interaction."'" As shown by the earlier
hypotheticals, it is not difficult to hypothesize similar proof problems in both
rape and robbery trials. Even if the hypotheticals are changed to make it
unclear as to whether the prior allegation was, in fact, false, the evidentiary
question is not altered.
For example, like rape, robbery may arise out of consensual human
interaction, such as that of a taxicab patron being picked up at an airport, taken
to a remote location and robbed by the cabdriver. In this example, the crime
takes place outside the presence of any witnesses, so that the ensuing
prosecution results in a credibility contest between robber and robbed. The
disputes at trial may involve identity, corpus delicti, consent, and extent of
force used. There may or may not be corroborating physical evidence of the
assault, and the jury will be forced to decide the case solely on the credibility
of the witnesses.
140. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 61, § 5231, at 334-39 (providing
an overview of state versions of Rule 404(a)).
141. Berger, supra note 10, at 7-10, 20-22.
142. Berger, supra note 10, at 7-10, 20-22.
143. Berger, supra note 10, at 21; Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 11, at 544-45.
144. Lucy R. Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
613, 638 (1976).
1995]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 7: 243
If the unlucky victim in the taxicab example had made a previous complaint
that he had been robbed on the subway by another passenger, which the
cabdriver defendant claims was a false accusation, the court is unlikely to see
the prior false allegation as so highly probative of the victim's credibility that
it will a) hold a hearing to determine whether the allegation is false, b) upon
determining that the allegation is false, permit both cross-examination and
extrinsic evidence to prove it, and c) justify the admission of the evidence on
the ground that the confrontation clause requires it. Robbery does not occur
in the gender-charged context in which rape occurs, and no extraordinary
suspicion is operating against the complaining party. 145 In reality, however,
the problems of proof may be quite similar, and the prior accusations should
be considered pursuant to 608(b) and 403,"4 whether they are proffered in
a robbery or rape case.
145. When the typical cross-examination of a rape complainant is applied to a hypothetical robbery
victim, the extraordinary suspicion of the witness in a rape case is convincingly demonstrated:
"Mr. Smith, you were held up at gunpoint on the corner of First and Main?"
"Yes."




"Then you made a conscious decision to comply with his demands rather than
resist?"
"Yes."
"Did you scream? Cry out?"
"No. I was afraid."
"I see. Have you ever been held up before?"
"No."
"Have you ever given money away?"
"Yes, of course."
"And you did so willingly?"
"What are you getting at?"
"Well let's put is like this, Mr. Smith. You've given money away in the past.
In fact, you have quite a reputation for philanthropy. How can we be sure that you
weren't contriving to have your money taken from you by force?"
"Listen, if I wanted ... "
"Never mind. What time did this holdup take place, Mr. Smith?"
"About 11:00 P.M."
"You were out on the street at 11:00 P.M.? Doing what?"
"Just walking."
"Just walking? You know that it's dangerous being out on the street that late at
night. Weren't you aware that you could have been held up?"
"I hadn't thought about it."
"What were you wearing at the time, Mr. Smith?"
"Let's see ... a suit. Yes, a suit."
"An expensive suit?"
"Well-yes. I'm a successful lawyer, you know."
"In other words, Mr. Smith, you were walking around the streets late at night
in a suit that practically advertised the fact that you might be a good target for some
easy money, isn't that so? I mean, if we didn't know better, Mr. Smith, we might even
think that you were asking for this to happen, mightn't we?"
House of Delegates Redefines Death, Urges Redefinition of Rape, and Undoes the Houston Amendments,
61 A.B.A.J. 463, 464 (1975).
146. See supra notes 37-8, 42-3 and accompanying text.
Prior False Allegations
B. Probative Value
Any consideration of specific acts evidence under 608(b)'47 must begin
with an analysis of probative value. Probative value is the degree to which the
proffered evidence assists the jury in accurately determining the credibility of
witnesses. 4 ' It does not exist in a vacuum but "should be viewed as a
product of the logical potential of evidence in the evidentiary and cognitive
context within which it is offered." 149 Under 608(b), the probative value of
a prior act may be viewed as the extent to which that act shows that the
witness has an untruthful character. 50 If the circumstances surrounding the
specific lie or deceptive conduct are similar to those of the case at trial, the
inference supposedly is stronger."'
As part of the probative value analysis, courts consider whether the prior
conduct alleged actually occured and whether the admission of evidence of the
prior conduct is overly prejudicial.' The probative value of the evidence
is weak if it is doubtful that the alleged past events actually occurred. But even
where there is no doubt as to their occurence, the circumstances may be so
different that they can have no bearing on the witness's veracity in the current
case. Thus, even if the evidence showed that the witness made a false
statement in the past, there must be a sufficient nexus between that statement
and the current charge. Returning to the robbery hypothetical, the fact that the
victim in the hypothetical was robbed before is not likely to be considered
probative on the issue of whether he is telling the truth about the second
robbery, because the circumstances are quite different. If, however, the victim
claimed that he had been robbed by a cabdriver in exactly the same way as
the current charge, then the past events would weigh more heavily in the
probative value analysis.
It is true that courts have considered prior deceptive conduct to bear on
witnesses's truthfulness in cases not involving sexual assault, so that witnesses
who have lied in the past may be impeached with those lies.' 53 It is true,
147. See supra note 38.
148. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 94; see also Gold, supra note 82, at 73
("[Elvidence has probative value if it enhances the accuracy of jury fact finding.").
149. Gold, supra note 82, at 76; see WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 94-97 (providing
list of factors relevant to contextual analysis of probative value).
150. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 94.
151. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 94-97.
152. See United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 674 (1st Cir. 1978) ("[Olne of the policy reasons
for Rule 608(b) ... [is to avoid] fact-finding detours to determine whether allegations of prior misconduct
on the part of the witness are accurate."); see also WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 96 n.19
(stating that "the party seeking to inquire into misconduct of a witness can be required to make a threshold
showing that there is some factual basis for the allegations," and citing cases); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 51, § 196, at 578 ("Exposing fraudulent claims is important, but so is protecting innocent
litigants from unfair prejudice.").
153. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 104-06 and nn. 53-76 (providing list of specific
acts that courts have admitted as probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness).
1995]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 7: 243
however, that the inquiry rarely has proceeded further than cross-examination
of the witness. 
154
By contrast, in cases involving prior false accusations of rape, the proper
analytic framework of probative value is distorted. The focus in these cases
is solely on whether the allegation is false. That is not the appropriate focus
under 608(b). 55 As discussed in Part I, in cases involving prior allegations
of rape, probative value is equated with falsity, so that if falsity is proved to
the satisfaction of the court in a pretrial hearing, the defendant is permitted
to use the evidence to impeach the victim's credibility at trial through cross-
examination and extrinsic evidence. 56 When evidence is admitted in this
manner, the only nexus between the prior accusation and the current rape is
that both charges concern sexual assault. This is insufficient evidence of
context to show that the victim has a propensity to lie about rape.57
The reliance on the gross similarity between sexual assault charges, rather
than on a more detailed analysis of each charge, is consistent with acceptance
154. See, e.g., United States v. Estell, 539 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S.
982 (1976) (impeachment of witness by showing specific instances of prior misconduct "must be in the
form of cross-examination"); United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendants
properly barred from calling psychiatrist to testify that informants who testified for prosecution were using
drugs during the trial); United States v. Banks, 475 F.2d 1367, 1368 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant properly
barred from calling witnesses to impeach informant by testifying to drug sales for which he had not been
tried or convicted); United States v. Lipowski, 423 F. Supp. 864, 868-69 (D.C.N.J. 1976) (stating that
witness who allegedly falsified tape recording with defendant could be cross-examined to impeach
defendant's credibility but that tape could not be used).
155. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 102-03 ("lilt should be clear that 'truthfulness
or untruthfulness' refers to the general character of the witness for veracity, not whether specific testimony
of the witness is correct"); FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee's note (stating that to prevent
substantial possibility of abuse, "safeguards are erected in the form of specific requirements that the
instances inquired into be probative of truthfulness or its opposite ... ").
156. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. One commentator suggests that the emphasis on
falsity is a safeguard sufficient to abandon all other considerations relevant to character evidence. Galvin,
supra note 9, at 858-63.
157. The similarity of the context of the past event and the current event is certainly an element of
probative value. But it should not be mistaken for "similar transactions," which is sometimes confused with
the doctrines of character and habit. For example, one commentator points out that prior false accusations
of a witness offered to attack the veracity of that witness in a subsequent, similar case is usually admissible,
even though it is a species of character evidence to show conduct because the inquiry is limited to cross-
examination. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 51, § 196, at 580 n. 12. This suggests that there is
a legitimate rule of relevance operating in both sexual assault and non-sexual assault cases based on similar
transactions. The cases the commentator cites, however, do not support this analysis. The sexual assault
cases cited are the Hulburt line of cases in which the inquiry is not limited to cross-examination and in
which the rationale is Wigmore's theory of the depraved female mind. The non-sexual assault cases involve
accusations that were proffered as part of a plan or motive to fabricate charges, which would be
independently admissible under the common law rules permitting extrinsic evidence for these purposes.
See also John R. Schmertz, Jr., The First Decade Under Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Some
Suggested Amendments to Fill Gaps and Cure Confusion, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1367, 1432 (1985) (stating
that extrinsic evidence of bias traditionally has been allowed under the common law, and 608(b) does not
bar it). Thus, to the extent the commentator suggests that sexual assault cases are treated the same as other
cases involving prior false accusations made by a witness, or that the rules of relevance relating to "similar
transactions" justify the admission of such evidence, the comment simply adds to the confusion. See 22
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5170, at
112-13 (1978) (similar transactions have been confused with the related evidentiary doctrines of character
and habit, leaving the precedent in a "state of hopeless disorder").
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of the myth that women will lie about rape. In reality, rape is multifarious."15
As in the Cox case,'5 9 the fact that a complaining witness previously lied
about the extent of her consent to sexual activity with her boyfriend has no
bearing on whether she is lying about the identity of a subsequent rapist with
whom she had no relationship. Whether a prior lie about rape was made under
circumstances that are relevant to the subsequent crime cannot be answered
by examining superficial, external similarities. The analysis of probative value
required by 608(b) for the admission of other character evidence should not
be brushed aside simply because the crime involved is rape.
C. The Focus on Falsity
Another problem resulting from the equation of falsity with probative value
is that courts must determine both that the accusations were made and that they
were false. The procedure to determine falsity that has been developed by
decisional law and by statute is one in which the court holds an in camera
hearing prior to trial to rule on admissibility. 160 At first blush, the in camera
hearing may be viewed as protection for the complaining party. The witness
cannot be confronted with the prior accusation for the first time during the trial
without time to prepare a response. The pretrial hearing also requires more
proof to ask questions about the prior allegations than the "good faith" basis
demanded of the questioner under 608(b).' 61 Nevertheless, the in camera
hearing poses a number of problems.
The first problem is the degree of certainty courts should require in the
pretrial hearing in determining whether the evidence of prior false accusations
should be admissible at trial. This question is more important than other
pretrial admissibility questions because falsity has been equated with probative
value. The evidence will be admitted if the court finds that the accusation was
false. Moreover, a collateral inquiry will be permitted unless the witness
admits the conduct. This suggests that the burden of proof should be high,
otherwise highly prejudicial evidence that courts agree may be totally irrelevant
if falsity is not shown will be admitted.
Courts have answered the burden of proof question differently. Some courts
have used standards such as proof by a preponderance of the evidence and
"reasonable probability of falsity." Other courts inquire whether the allegations
are "demonstrably false," or "proven false."' 62 At least one federal court
158. See generally ESTRICH, supra note 3.
159. State v. Cox, 443 A.2d 607 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), aft'd, 468 A.2d 319 (Md. 1983). See
supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Cox case).
160. See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 545 So.2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); Covington v. State,
703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Mass.
1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1995).
161. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 96 n. 19; Schmertz, supra note 158, at 1435-37.
162. See, e.g., Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (requiring defendant to make
threshhold showing that prior allegations are "demonstrably false"); Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 90 (Nev.
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has held that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, pretrial admissibility is
judged by a preponderance of the evidence standard, the same standard
governing other questions requiring the court to determine facts to support
admissibility. 
163
The term "proven false" implies that the courts will accept a judgment of
acquittal, or even dismissals of the charges, as sufficient evidence of falsity;
however, the few decisions that have chosen and applied a burden of proof to
the facts of a particular case have not accepted that proposition. Prior
allegations that were the subject of a legal proceeding, such as a criminal
prosecution for sexual assault, have not been held to establish that the charges
were false even though the prosecution was not successful.t" The mere fact
of acquittal establishes only that the prosecution did not convince the jury of
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.165 Similarly, the
prosecution's failure to dismiss or drop a charge is not evidence that the
charges were false.' The same analysis applies to the results of civil
proceedings for sexual harassment.'67
The second problem is that the pretrial hearing can be as lengthy as the
trial itself. For example, in Smith v. State, the defendant called nine witnesses
in a pretrial hearing to testify about prior allegations of sexual assault made
by the complaining witness, a minor. 68 Five testified that they had "heard"
that the victim made similar allegations against them and that they were
innocent of any wrongdoing. 169 Another witness testified that he had also
"heard" about similar allegations against him but that the victim had recanted
in his presence; he also denied wrongdoing. 7° Two other witnesses testified
to the complaining witness's recantation of sexual allegations against people
other than Smith and a ninth witness testified that she had "heard" similar
1989) (requiring threshold showing that prior allegations are false by a preponderance of the evidence);
State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring threshold showing that prior
allegations have "a reasonable probability of falseness"). But see People v. Sheperd, 551 P.2d 210, 212
(Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (finding cross-examination allowed "if the contention that the accusation was false
is supportable").
163. United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (W.D.N.C. 1991) (citing Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)).
164. See, e.g., State v. Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d 830, 833 (Idaho 1984); People v. Alexander, 452
N.E.2d 591, 592, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). See also 71 A.L.R.4th 469, 488-504 (providing additional case
citations).
165. Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d at 833.
166. Alexander, 452 N.E.2d at 595 (holding that the fact that prior charge was dismissed after a
finding of no probable cause did not show that it was false). Indeed, the failure of police and prosecutors
to pursue rape charges for reasons of gender bias has been the subject of controversy for many years. See
ESTRICH, supra note 2, at 16 (simple rape not pursued because it does not fit the stereotype). F.B.I. crime
statistics show that rape has the highest percentage of "unfounded" complaints. 1993 FBI UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 24. Of all attempted rapes, only 52.5% were actually reported to the
police. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 102 (1992).
167. See, e.g., State v. Goodnow, 649 A.2d 752, 754 (Vt. 1994).
168. 377 S.E.2d 158, 159 (Ga. 1989).
169. Id.
170. Id.
270 [Vol. 7: 243
Prior False Allegations
recantations. 171 The trial court refused to admit the evidence because it found
that Georgia's rape shield law barred its admission. 72 The court permitted
several defense witnesses to testify regarding the victim's alleged lack of
truthfulness. 73 Nevertheless, the appellate court reversed the conviction,
holding that specific evidence of the complaining witness's propensity to make
false charges was admissible if the trial court found that it was reasonably
probable that the allegations were false. 1
74
The pretrial hearing creates other problems similar to those associated with
the collateral excursion at trial. Complaining witnesses may be deterred from
coming forward if they know that their "past" is at issue; the exploration of
the lie may involve explanations of the witness's sexual past. If the
complaining witness testifies, the defendant has yet another opportunity to
question her before trial, with the hope that she will make inconsistent
statements or will be too intimidated to continue. 75 Furthermore, the focus
of the case is shifted back to the innocence of the complaining witness,
requiring a virtue that is not demanded of other witnesses. If the judge then
decides that all of the evidence may be presented to the jury, both prosecutor
and witness may decide not to proceed.
The pretrial hearing has become a feature of rape shield legislation to
protect the complaining witness and to allow the court to consider evidence
that may be excepted by those statutes. 176 Judges naturally turn to the pretrial
hearing as a means to prevent the admission of irrelevant and damaging
evidence. This approach is flawed, however, because it is based on the faulty
premise that falsity equals probative value, placing greater emphasis on falsity
than would ordinarily be the case under Rule 608(b).
Under Rule 608(b), a court assesses probative value and considers whether
the prior allegation actually occurred and whether admission of the allegations
is too prejudicial. 177 No standard of proof is specified in 608(b) to determine
the admissibility of what are usually uncharged bad acts, but pretrial hearings
over this issue are avoided. Again, the stakes are limited to cross-examination,
so that less judicial time and emphasis are placed on whether the accusation




174. Id. at 160. Interestingly, the court did not comment on the obvious hearsay nature of the
evidence, and the fact that, apparently, no complaints were made to any official authority or in any official
proceeding. Under these circumstances, the evidence was appropriately handled as general reputation
evidence. If it was based on more than appears in the opinion, the number of accusations could support
a pattern of false charging that would be admissible regardless of any restrictions on specific acts.
175. But see Berger, supra note 10 at 72-73 (expressing concern that rape shield legislation at pretrial
hearings will unfairly require defendants to disclose their defense).
176. WRirHT & GRAHAM, supra note 59, § 5391. But see FED. R. EVID. 412(c) (revised rule no
longer permits witnesses at pretrial hearing).
177. See supra Part II.B.
1995]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 7: 243
important than the rule applied,'78 it is more sensible to consider prior false
accusations of rape under 608(b), which would lower the stakes of admitting
prior allegations by restricting the inquiry into them to cross-examination. The
necessity of holding a pretrial hearing would be eliminated. Moreover, a
608(b) analysis would offer two opportunities to exclude the evidence. It may
be excluded because of limited probative value, or it may be excluded under
Rule 403, as tending to cause inferential errors by the jury.179
In fact, there is a trend toward excluding prior false accusations on
essentially the same theory as 608(b) even in jurisdictions that continue to treat
prior false accusations as a separate type of character evidence. The focus is
still on falsity, but the defendant's proffer seems to be subjected to stricter
scrutiny.50 As a consequence, evidence is screened at the proffer stage. On
appeal, courts may state the special rule for sexual assault cases, accept the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence, and even voice concern over the
Confrontation Clause, but they ultimately uphold the trial judge's refusal to
admit the evidence. 8' In reality, evidence is being excluded for failure to
show falsity that should have been excluded for lack of probative value. The
difference is that there is no restriction on the collateral inquiry if the evidence
is admitted.
178. See Althouse, Thelma and Louise, supra note 79, at 761 ("The reasoning processes of the human
mind do not come from rules of evidence. ");Althouse, The Lying Woman, supra note 35, at 924
("Assessments of relevance depend on preexisting belief systems.").
179. See Gold, supra note 81, at 68; infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 477 N.W.2d 877, 879-80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (although prior
false allegations of rape bear on victim's credibility, defendant was not able to make the requisite offer
of proof to justify introduction of evidence); State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d 193, 199-200 (Mont. 1984)
(adopts Hulburt rule, and further reason for dismissal of prior allegation of rape victim would not establish
falsity and would be highly prejudicial); State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d 302, 311 (N.D. 1984) (failure
to pursue rape charge against ex-husband did not indicate charge was false and ex-husband's unsubstantiated
testimony was insufficient to establish the falsity of the previous charge); State v. Demos, 619 P.2d 968,
969-70 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying admission of evidence
of two allegedly false prior accusations of rape, the first of which was reported to authorities, but not
pursued because no suspects were located and the complaining witness left town, and the second, also not
pursued, rested entirely on the polygraph examiner's interpretations of the complaining witness'ss answers
which would not have been admissible evidence).
181. See, e.g., State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (accepting rule that
extrinsic evidence is constitutionally compelled if witness denies prior false allegations of rape, but
upholding trial court's exclusion of prior accusations on grounds that defendant failed to show falsity of
three prior accusations); State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 615 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (confrontation clause
requires that defendant be able to cross-examine complaining witness concerning other allegations 1) if
plaintiff has recanted, 2) if defendant demonstrates they are false, or 3) there is "some evidence" that the
victim has made prior accusations that were false, unless probative value is substantially outweighed by
prejudice, confusion, embarrassment, or delay). In LeClair, there was "some evidence" from which the
court might find false allegations in 1981 and 1984. Both incidents failed the balancing test because they
were likely to result in significant delay and jury confusion. The probative value of the 1981 incident was
also diminished because of its remoteness, the victim's young age at the time, the fact that the only evidence
of the accusation was a CSD report quoting the victim's mother, where both the victim and her mother
denied that there was any incident, or any accusations made, in 1981. Id.
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D. Problems with Character Evidence
Rule 608(b) is already a compromise between competing policies in what
has been a controversial area of evidence law: using evidence of specific acts
to attack credibility." 2 On one hand, the rule's purpose is to promote
accurate fact-finding, prevent witness harassment, and eliminate the expense
and delay resulting from unnecessary inquiry into collateral matters."'3 On
the other hand, the rule admits evidence that undercuts each one of those goals
to some degree."8 4 Both its limited application to acts bearing on a witness's
character for truthfulness and its bar on extrinsic evidence are attempts to
balance the jury's need to have sufficient evidence of credibility with its need
to focus primarily on the issues at hand.' 85 Completely ignoring the rule
leaves judicial discretion unlimited in an area that commentators view as
fraught with danger. 186
The principal danger of character evidence is that it takes on an importance
to the jury that may be disproportionate to its actual probative value, thereby
prompting an improper decision.' 87 Psychological studies show that jurors
infer that character evidence can be used to accurately predict behavior, but
that this inference itself is doubtful.' 88 When rape mythology is added to the
questionable proposition that behavior can be predicted by prior acts,8 9 the
danger increases that the jurors will give disproportionate weight to the
character evidence. The admission of such evidence is likely to give vent to
the myth of the lying woman/innocent man on the part of the jury. As a result,
the jurors may structure their beliefs in accordance with their preconceived
ideas, rather than the actual events of the case. 9 These risks are present
whether or not extrinsic evidence is allowed, but if the inquiry moves beyond
cross-examination, the danger is that they will rise to an unreasonable level.
The tradeoff for the admission of character evidence of truthfulness is that
182. WRIGHrT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6112; Schmertz, supra note 157, at 1424-39. Some
jurisdictions did not adopt 608(b), completely barring the use of specific acts evidence to attack credibility.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.609 (West 1995).
183. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, at 32.
184. Id. at 33.
185. Id. § 6112.
186. Id. § 6112; Schmertz, supra note 157, at 1424-39; H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character,
and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 789-93 (1993).
187. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6113, at 42.
188. Id. § 6118, at 98-99 (indicating that psychological studies show that people assume that behavior
is influenced by disposition, but that other studies show that behavior cannot be accurately predicted on
personality tests or past behavior in similar circumstances). This suggests that, in general, specific instances
evidence is likely to be misused by the jury and that the mythology surrounding rape enhances the
likelihood of misuse.
189. Id. § 6118, at 98-99; see Uviller, supra note 186, at 789-93 (discussing apparent underlying
premises on which evidence of character for veracity is made relevant under rules and arguing that none
of these premises withstands analysis).
190. Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 280-93 (1993); Torrey,
supra note 2, at 1047-55.
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the inquiry will be limited to cross-examination.' 91 The purpose of Rule
608(b) is to avoid lengthy excursions into collateral matters, which over-
emphasize the collateral issues, confuse the jury, and waste judicial
resources. 192 Obviously, when extrinsic evidence is admitted for the purpose
of impeaching the complaining witness's testimony in a rape case, the tradeoff
is lost. If the accusation is denied on cross-examination, and the defendant is
permitted to introduce additional witnesses to prove the alleged lie, the case
becomes a trial-within-a-trial. The witness is once again placed on trial for
events in her social, and sometimes sexual, history. Even if the witness admits
the conduct, the nature of the evidence is so prejudicial that the state will be
forced to produce an explanation of the incident that may involve sexual
conduct.'93 Either way the courts are led directly into a conflict with the
purpose of rape shield statutes."'
From the standpoint of assisting the jury, the collateral inquiry has dubious
utility. Not only does it pursue evidence that has low probative value, but one
commentator suggests that asking the jury to compare the credibility of the
impeached witness with that of the impeaching witness does little to help the
jury decide who is telling the truth. 9 ' In the end, each juror is forced to
evaluate the witnesses' testimony according to his or her own view of
plausibility, which is shaped by the individual juror's own experiences. 1
96
If the jury's cultural context or experiences are different from the actors, there
may be no "plausibility match."' 97 If the jury is without touchstones in a rape
case, stereotypical scenarios may be supplied to reach a resolution that has a
"logical" fit for the jury, but no relation to the facts.'9"
191. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
192. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 11, § 6118, at 97-102.
193. The evidence is highly prejudicial because it arouses the lying woman/innocent man myth. See
supra Part I.D and accompanying text. For examples of the judicial view of the degree of prejudice
accompanying such evidence, see People v. Hulburt, 333 P.2d 82, 88 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ("The
point does not have to be labored that the chances of the verdict of the jury being correct will definitely
be enhanced if the jury has before it the fact that the prosecutrix had, on occasions in the past, made similar
charges against the defendant or others which were subsequently denied or proved false."); Cox v. State,
443 A.2d 607, 613 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (evidence of prior false allegation "would certainly be
'likely to affect her credibility' in the eyes of the jury").
194. See Althouse, The Lying Woman, supra note 35, at 965-66 (witness impeached by prior false
accusations of rape will be forced to establish her credibility); but see Galvin, supra note 9, at 858-63
(arguing that proof of prior false allegations of rape will almost never require introduction of sexual conduct
evidence, but to extent they do, rape shield statutes should be amended to allow their admission because
of their high probative value). Because rape shield statutes are for the protection of the complaining witness,
presumably she could waive the statute if necessary to establish her credibility. Rule 608(b) is no bar to
extrinsic rebuttal evidence, subject to Rules 401 and 403. Schmertz, supra note 157, at 1429-30.
195. Uviller, supra note 186, at 781 (discussing the utility of impeachment by contradiction). Using
extrinsic evidence to impeach witnesses in rape cases on collateral matters is technically impeachment by
contradiction, which is a permissible method of impeachment, but only when it relates to matters in issue.
It is not permitted if the issue is collateral. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 50, § 47, at 110.
196. Uviller, supra note 186, at 783-84.
197. Id.
198. Coombs, supra note 190, at 280-93 (arguing that range of credible stories of rape is narrower
than range of true ones, and to be successful at trial, women have to tell stories that fit within range of
cultural myths).
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Gold argues that, in weighing the probative value of evidence, the judge
can reliably predict how the jury will use the evidence. 99 If the jury is likely
to make an inferential error by giving the evidence too much weight, or is
operating under a bias that distorts reality, the admission of even a single fact
may encourage the jury in that direction, and the evidence should be
excluded. 2" According to this theory, it may be argued that even cross-
examination about a prior false accusation may unduly affect accurate fact
finding, but to permit a collateral excursion into the issue would virtually
guarantee it.
It is hard to find a justification for the introduction of extrinsic evidence
to prove untruthfulness of character. The drafters of Rule 608(b) and the courts
that have applied the rule have not specified exceptions in which there is
reason to depart from the rule's prohibition on extrinsic evidence. Given the
potential for misuse of character evidence in general, and the exacerbation of
the problem caused by the inclusion of rape mythology, the compromise
inherent in 608(b) should not be abandoned in sexual assault trials.
III.
A perplexing question that remains is whether the abandonment of a
gender-biased evidentiary rule and the adoption of a facially neutral rule will
solve the problem. A review of the cases involving prior false accusations of
rape suggests that judges who cling to rape mythology will find, within their
broad discretion to determine probative value, a rationale for the admission
of this evidence. This conclusion supports the claim that judges' discretion is
so broad that it renders rules meaningless. If this is true, why advocate the
rejection of the special rule that has developed in many jurisdictions in favor
of existing rules of broad application?
The first step in solving the problem is to eliminate an evidentiary rule that
arose out of the irrational fear of false accusation and the general mistrust of
women's credibility on sexual matters. The character evidence rules are the
logical substitute. They provide an unbiased framework by which a witness's
prior false statements may be assessed, whether the witness is testifying in a
rape or a robbery. Without these tools, judges cannot solve the evidentiary
problems that come before them. Applying the ordinary rules to rape cases
may not change the way a biased judge views the evidence, but it may keep
neutral judges from being pushed in the wrong direction.
The few courts that have given fair consideration to the probative value
of prior false accusations offered for purposes of discerning character have
199. Gold, supra note 81, at 68.
200. This view assumes that the judge will not make the same inferential errors. See Id. at 68-69.
Although Gold is referring to an analysis of probative value and prejudice under Rule 403, his arguments
on the judicial exercise of discretion apply with equal force to 608(b), not only because the concept is the
same, but because 403 may exclude evidence that is admissible under 608(b).
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recognized that sexual assault crimes do not present singular problems of proof
that must be overcome by unique rules. If such precedent increases, more
courts will begin to view this issue like any other prior false statement of a
witness. Judges who are guided by myth will be compelled to state reasons
why a complaining witness's propensity to lie in a rape case is stronger than
for any other crime. Judges who are not guided by myth, but who are blindly
following a substantial and confusing line of precedent, may be persuaded by
rational arguments to the contrary.
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